Economic theory predicts that vaccination policies at the local level can be negatively affected by the policies of neighboring regions because of free-riding motives, whereas positive dependency may exist due to policy diffusions among localities. By using the unique variations in the provision of vaccination subsidies in Japan, we assess how vaccination policies in a local government are affected by the decisions of neighboring governments. We find that the provision of vaccination subsidies is positively correlated with the decisions of neighboring localities. Moreover, a correlation is found with neighboring municipalities within the same prefecture but not with those in surrounding prefectures, indicating that the correlations are likely to arise because of mimicking behavior among localities within a prefecture. Our results show that vaccination policies tend to be formed following neighboring municipalities and do not necessarily aim to optimize community health, thus questioning the autonomy of local government authorities regarding vaccination policies.
| INTRODUCTION
Vaccination against infectious diseases is an effective tool for protecting public health globally, and governmental authorities implement immunization programs. Japan's immunization policy is often perceived as lagging behind those of other developed nations because of the delay in vaccine licensing (e.g., Saitoh & Okabe, 2014) and limited coverage of vaccines under the national immunization program (Shimazaki & Ikeda, 2012) . For those vaccines outside the national program, municipal authorities often provide financial support (Akazawa, Yongue, Ikeda, & Satoh, 2014; Hayashi, Shimizu, Netsu, Hanley, & Konno, 2012) . As of 2010, however, the proportion of municipal authorities that provide subsidies for voluntary vaccination is limited, ranging from only 0.6% to 18.6% depending on the vaccine (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2010) . As financial support is a crucial factor in the uptake of vaccination among individuals (e.g., Ibuka & Bessho, 2015) , it is essential to understand what factors influence the decisions of municipal authorities regarding policies pertaining to providing financial support for vaccinations, given the lack of a national policy in this regard.
Together with the usual socioeconomic factors of municipalities that could influence policymaking, we explore the interdependency among municipalities and test two hypotheses regarding the limited provision of subsidies. On the one hand, classical theory predicts that a negative dependency between neighbors exists due to a free-riding effect (Brito, Sheshinski, & Intriligator, 1991; Francis, 1997) . This is because municipal governments may have an incentive to take advantage of the "herd protection" effects produced by vaccination programs in surrounding municipalities (Khaleghian, 2004) . On the other hand, vaccination policies can be positively correlated because of policy diffusions among neighbors (Ito, 2002; Revelli, 2006) . The positive correlation, per se, does not always predict a low level of subsidy provision. However, if the majority does not provide subsidies, a subsidy program is likely to shrink toward contraction through the correlation, leading to a phenomenon called "the race to the bottom" (e.g., Costa-Font, DeAlbuquerque, & Doucouliagos, 2015) .
Regardless of the low cost of vaccine and thus, minor budgetary impact of subsidy programs, local governments are usually very careful about policy making regarding vaccination, as authorities tend to put a heavier weight on the potential risk of rare events of reactions as a result of vaccination.
1 Specifically, local governments do not have strong incentives for implementing vaccination subsidy programs as they are reluctant to take responsibility for making recommendations for subsidizing vaccines that are not included in the national program. The reluctance is partly related to the current institution of the immunization program in Japan, where there is a nonnegligible discrepancy in the compensation in case of severe side effects between the vaccines that are covered and not covered by the national program (Enami & Otsubo, 2010) . 2 In the process of policy making that has high uncertainty as a consequence, local officials tend to refer to other similar governments (Ito, 2002) , and such strategic interactions cause policy diffusion through information spillover in public service provision in Japan as well as in other counties (Bessho & Miyamoto, 2012; Fernandez & Forder, 2015; Mascone, 2011; Revelli, 2006; Rincke, 2009 ).
We adopt a regression model with a spatial structure, which is often used to analyze the geographical dependence of public policies or the outcomes of such policies (e.g., Revelli, 2015) . Our empirical design lies in taking advantage of the borders of upper government to identify which or both of the two effects is supported by the data. The externality from vaccination affects the population irrespective of the borders of upper government, whereas the political border could matter for policy diffusion through information spillover as local governments often refer to governments that are "similar" to themselves. Thus, by using the border of upper government, we can identify which or both of the two sources of interdependency affects policy decisions. Empirically, we handle this by employing two matrices to describe the effect of neighbors: one for neighboring municipalities within the same prefecture and the other for those in surrounding prefectures. A similar strategy has been used to identify the cause of the correlation between local governments in tax mimicking (Cassette, Di Porto, & Foremny, 2012; Revelli, 2011) .
| BACKGROUND
In Japan, vaccination is not a part of the benefits of public health insurance programs, and the national immunization program determines the vaccines that it would cover. In 2010, the year under analysis, the Preventive Vaccination Act of Japan, which recommends vaccinations, stipulated two kinds of diseases (Enami & Otsubo, 2010) : nine Type I diseases (diphtheria, whooping cough [pertussis], acute poliomyelitis [polio], measles, rubella, Japanese encephalitis, tetanus, tuberculosis, and smallpox 3 ) and one Type II disease (influenza for people aged 65 years old and above). These two types of vaccines are often called "routine" vaccinations under the national immunization program. Those not included as either Type I or II diseases are called "voluntary" vaccinations (Nakayama, 2013) . Voluntary vaccines, which we study in this paper, include the Hib, hepatitis B virus (HBV), mumps, varicella, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7 and PPSV23), and the human papillomavirus (HPV).
One important difference between routine and voluntary vaccinations is the financial burden of the vaccinee. Municipalities, the first tier of local government, are responsible for administering routine vaccinations to their residents at no or a negligible cost. 4 Municipalities receive intergovernmental transfers from prefectures, the second tier 1 Some municipal governments present descriptions of their policy meetings on vaccinations online. We investigated these policy-making processes.
One municipality discusses the introduction of subsidies for a voluntary vaccine, and they said that they needed to consult with medical professionals, as providing subsidies for a vaccine meant that they were making a recommendation of the vaccine (Nangoku City). Further, a few municipalities consider the difference in the disability assistance pension between routine and voluntary vaccine in the process of policy making on subsidies for voluntary vaccines (Takeo-cho and Kamagaya City). Some municipalities purchase extra insurance to prepare for the potential risk of side effects from voluntary vaccines (Tsukuba City).
2 For example, in 2018 child disability assistance pension is ¥1,557,600 for routine vaccine and ¥865,200 per year in cases of the severest side effects of vaccination. Medical expenses and benefits are the same between both types of vaccines.
3 Small pox vaccination is currently not implemented on a regular basis but will be done in case of a risk of infection due to bioterrorism. 4 There were 1,767 municipalities in 47 prefectures in 2010, and the number of municipalities in a prefecture ranges from 15 in Toyama prefecture to 186 in Hokkaido.
of local government, and the central government to finance these costs (Akazawa et al., 2014) . On the contrary, individuals tend to pay the full cost of voluntary vaccinations out of their own pockets, with the exception of the subsidy programs provided by municipalities (Hayashi et al., 2012) . Hence, although the overall immunization policies were formed at the national level, the municipality government is responsible for the implementation of the program. The tasks of a municipal government include the administration of routine vaccines, decision making on subsidy programs for voluntary vaccines, and the implementation of the program based on their decision. The prefecture supervises vaccination programs implemented at the municipality level. Given the limited implementation of such subsidy programs, individuals are less likely to receive voluntary vaccinations for financial reasons, leading to a low level of vaccination coverage for those vaccines. For example, vaccination coverage against mumps, a voluntary vaccination, ranges from 13% to 30% (National Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2003; Sugawara et al., 2007) , whereas the corresponding proportion for measles and rubella, routine vaccinations, is greater than 95% (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2017) . Akazawa et al. (2014) point out that this difference in the provision of subsidies at the municipality level has led to disparities in vaccine utilization across Japan. Low vaccination rates are consequently associated with persistently high incidences of target diseases. For example, mumps is endemic in Japan, and many children develop complications including hearing loss, whereas only 3.5% of municipalities provide subsidies for a vaccine against it (Saitoh & Okabe, 2014) .
| ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION

| Model specification and identification
This study uses a regression analysis to examine the factors that affect the vaccination subsidy policy of Japanese municipal governments. Our strategy to examine the two hypotheses employs the borders of upper government. The model is thus an extension of a spatial Durbin model often used in the literature on fiscal federalism (Elhorst, 2010 ; see Sections 1 and 2 for the model selection and details of the spatial Durbin model). The following estimation equation is used: Some previous studies use the borders of upper governments to identify fiscal competition (Gérard et al., 2010; Cassette et al., 2012; Atella, Belotti, Depalo, & Mortari, 2014; Yu, Zhou, & Zhu, 2016) . Among them, Yu et al. (2016) is the most similar to ours, studying the interactions among Chinese prefectural-level cities, distinguishing the neighboring cities located in the same province from those outside the province.
Our aim is to identify the effect of policy diffusion from that of free-riding motives. It is natural to assume that freeriding effects arise irrelevant to the borders of upper governments, because they are triggered by communicable diseases. On the contrary, the borders of upper governments may or may not matter for policy diffusion, depending on the reference target for a municipality. If municipalities make decisions based only on the decisions of their counterparts within the same prefecture, borders should matter. If they make decisions following all neighboring prefectures, borders should not matter.
These hypotheses can be translated into the coefficients β I and β O . Let FR be the effect of free-riding, PDI be the effect of policy diffusion from municipalities within the same prefecture, and PDO be policy diffusion from municipalities outside the prefecture. We expect that FR ≤ 0, PDI ≥ 0, and PDO ≥ 0. Then, the coefficients can be decomposed as β I = FR + PDI and β O = FR + PDO.
To identify PDI and PDO, we focus on vaccines against HPV, which is transmitted through physical (sexual) contact rather than nonphysical contact. Thus, there is expected to be no location-dependent free-riding effect for vaccines against HPV. In other words, we assume that FR = 0 for the HPV vaccine, and PDI and PDO are identifiable from β I and β O . With the two assumptions that (a) there is no free-rider incentive for the HPV vaccine and (b) the degree of policy diffusion is the same between HPV and other vaccines, we then identify FR from the coefficients in the regression regarding the other vaccines. The first assumption is based on how a disease spreads. HPV transmits through sexual contact, whereas others through face-to-face contact.
One may doubt whether prefectural borders matter for the free-riding effect, as a prefecture border, which is often a mountain range or river, could correspond to a geographical barrier that prevents people from traveling between cities beyond the border. In such areas, the free-riding effects from municipalities outside the prefecture may be small, if they exist at all. To consider such a possibility, we conduct an additional analysis by limiting our sample to the greater Tokyo area, where mobility between prefectures is easiest.
| Estimation method
We must address two issues in the estimation of Equation (1) , are endogenous because we assume interdependence among local governments. Therefore, ordinary least squares estimators are typically inconsistent. Second, as we describe in Section 4, our main dependent variables are binary, representing whether local governments offer a vaccination subsidy or not. To address these issues, we adopt the linear probability model and apply the 2SLS estimation method following Kelejian and Prucha (1998) .
The 2SLS estimation requires valid instrumental variables: These instruments must be correlated with the spatial lag terms (relevancy) and uncorrelated with the error term (exogeneity). Here, we assume that the other explanatory variables included in X are exogenous. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Elhorst (2010) . The validity of the instruments is checked by using the Sargan and Cragg-Donald statistics.
| Spatial weight matrix
Three types of spatial weight matrices W are used in this study: contiguity based, distance based, and Fiscal Index Tables for Similar Municipalities (FITS-M) based. All the matrices are row normalized. The first is a standard adjacent matrix. If municipalities i and j are contiguous, the (i, j) element of the spatial weight matrix is temporarily assigned a weight of 1, and 0 otherwise. The second is a matrix based on the geographical distance between municipalities. If the distance between the two municipal offices of municipalities i and j is k ij kilometers, the (i, j) element of the spatial weight matrix is temporarily assigned a weight of max(50 − k ij , 0).
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The third is a matrix based on the similarity with respect to the socioeconomic situation. To define "similar" municipalities, we use the FITS-M, published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. FITS-M categorizes municipalities into 35 groups according to their population and industrial composition. Following Hayashi and Yamamoto (2017) , the (i, j) element of the spatial weight matrix is temporarily assigned a weight of 1 if municipalities i and j are categorized into the same group in FITS-M in 2008. We estimate Equation (1) by using the three types of spatial weight matrices and compare the log-likelihood values (Borck, Fossen, Freier, & Martin, 2015; Elhorst, 2010) . In many cases, the models with distance-based matrices perform best. Therefore, we use the distance-based spatial weight matrix in our main specifications. Results using other weights are presented in Table S9 .
4 | DATA
| Vaccination policy
The data are taken from a survey conducted in 2010 by the MHLW to explore ongoing municipality-level programs of vaccination subsidies that include variables we need for the analyses (see Section 3). As the survey was conducted only once, our dataset is cross sectional.
Although 97.4% of municipalities subsidize influenza vaccination for the elderly, the proportions of the municipalities with subsidies for the other vaccinations are far lower (Table 1) . Considering these low rates of vaccination, we first focus on whether municipalities subsidize residents for the cost of vaccination except for influenza. Thus, we first set Z as an indicator variable that takes unity if the local government subsidizes vaccinations for each vaccine.
As a robustness check, we use three alternative dependent variables. The first is the amount of vaccination subsidies for influenza for the elderly. The second is the number of subsidized vaccinations, excluding the influenza vaccination for the elderly, which is classified as a Type II disease vaccination unlike the others. The maximum value of this variable is six, including Hib, PCV7, PPSV23, varicella, mumps, and HPV. The third is the number of subsidized vaccinations for children (Hib, PCV7, varicella, and mumps) as there may be a difference in decisions on vaccines for children and for the rest of the population.
| Explanatory variables
Previous studies have examined a wide range of factors that influence vaccination policy making (e.g., Bryson, Duclos, Jolly, & Bryson, 2010; Silva et al., 2015; González-Lorenzo et al., 2015) . Burchett, Mounier-Jack, Griffiths, and Mills (2012) identify nine criteria that affect national decisions to adopt new vaccines: the importance of the health problem; vaccine characteristics; immunization program considerations; acceptability; accessibility, equity, and ethics; financial/economic issues; the magnitude of impact of a program; alternative interventions; and the policy-making process. Because this study examines the decision making of local governments in a single industrialized country on vaccination subsidies, we focus on the policymaking process as well as impact and financial issues among others, taking data availability into consideration. The before-subsidy prices are of some clinics in 2015, which are available on the internet. A is the Senju Mildix Pediatrics Clinic, B is the Kawada Pediatrics Clinic, C is the Aozora Children's Hospital, D is the Travel and Infectious Diseases Clinic of the National Center for Global Health and Medicine, and E is the Japanese Quarantine Association. Because vaccination fees differ among medical institutions (Kuwabara & Ching, 2014) , the extent to which the subsidy covers the fee is difficult to quantify precisely. The median subsidies can be seen to halve the vaccination fees.
b Is the price of PCV13.
Two explanatory variables are used to represent the decision-making process: (a) the situation of neighboring local governments presented by the spatial lag term, as discussed above, and (b) the ratio of the number of local government workers that have a medical doctors license to the total number of local governments. 6 For the impact-related variables, we use demographic variables including the ratio of children aged under five, the ratio of the elderly aged 65 and above, and population density.
Two fiscal variables are employed as explanatory variables to control for financial issues, tax revenue per capita, and local bonds outstanding per capita. Because no intergovernmental transfers are granted from upper-level governments for subsidies for voluntary vaccination, the decision to offer a vaccination subsidy depends on local governments own revenue. In addition, we run a regression including prefectural dummies as explanatory variables. Data sources are presented in Table S4 . We check multicollinearity using mean variance inflation factor (VIF) and confirm that multicollinearity is not a problem in all the cases, judging from the criteria of ten in mean VIF (Table S5) .
| RESULTS
| Descriptive statistics
Over 70% of municipalities provide no subsidies for any voluntary vaccinations, and only three subsidize all six voluntary vaccinations (Table S6 ). Subsidy patterns also differ across municipalities. For example, among the 355 municipalities that subsidize one of the six voluntary vaccinations, 211 (59%) subsidize the PPSV23 vaccination and 76 (21%) subsidize the Hib vaccination. On the contrary, among the nine municipalities that provide subsidies for five out of the six voluntary vaccinations, the nonsubsidized vaccination is HPV in five municipalities, PCV7 in three, and PPSV23 in one. The correlations among subsidies for voluntary vaccinations are all positive but not very large except for the case between mumps and varicella (Table S7) , perhaps because vaccination against mumps and varicella, together with rubella, is often received at the same time.
| Regression analysis: Baseline cases
Given the low correlation among subsidy patterns mentioned above, we use an equation-by-equation estimation. We also conducted various statistical tests and selected the spatial Durbin model as described in Section 3.1. Table 2 shows the sample statistics. Table 3 shows the estimation results with the spatial matrix based on distance where the borders of upper-level governments are taken into consideration. 7 The Sargan statistics suggest that the instrumental variables are exogenous except for the case of varicella. The results of the Anderson LM test for underidentification suggest that the models are not underidentified. On the basis of these statistics, our instruments are valid in these regression models.
6 Sakanishi et al. (2014) show the importance of medical doctors in local governments in health or medical policy making.
7 Table S6 shows the estimation results based on the other types of spatial weight matrices including adjacent and FITS-M-based matrices. The estimated coefficients of the spatial lags are all positive, consistent with the baseline result in Table 3 . The coefficients of the weighted average of neighboring local governments in the same prefecture, β
I
, are all statistically significantly positive. The estimates are larger than 0.5 and even close to unity. In some cases, they are above one.
8 On the contrary, the coefficients of the weighted average of neighboring local governments in surrounding prefec- To summarize, we find the following. First, positive policy diffusion exists, and the magnitude of the effect is greater for municipalities within the same prefecture than those located in neighboring prefectures. Second, there is also a freeriding effect. Third, overall, the effects of policy diffusion outweigh the free-riding effect.
The positive correlations in policies between neighboring municipalities can be explained by reasons other than policy diffusion from other municipalities. For example, subsidy policies are affected by the advice and monitoring provided by upper-level governments. Thus, we additionally run regressions including prefecture indicators (see Table S8 ). The result in the analysis is qualitatively consistent with the result in Table 3 . Thus, the observed positive correlation in vaccination policies within the same prefecture is likely to be due to the horizontal policy diffusion between municipalities in the same prefecture.
9 Japanese municipalities may, thus, regard those in the same prefecture as a reference group, because comparisons with such municipalities are often observed, for example, in the budget-making process.
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In addition, one might suspect the effect of common shocks (e.g., Costa-Font & Moscone, 2008) . For example, municipalities that provide subsidies for vaccines are more susceptible to infectious diseases than those without 8 However, considering the magnitude of standard errors, they may be smaller than one. 9 The literature views that the positive coefficient of the spatial lag term reflects yardstick competition or mimicking (e.g., Baskaran, 2014; Finney & Yoon, 2011; Fiva & Rattsø, 2007; Hall & Ross, 2010; Lyytikäinen, 2012; Rincke, 2009) , whereas some studies find that yardstick competition results in the positive correlation of the spatial error term (e.g., Bordignon, Cerniglia, & Revelli, 2003; Revelli & Tovmo, 2007). 10 Yardstick competition at the regional level in policy making was also previously reported by Nakazawa (2007) and Bessho and Miyamoto (2012) . provision. In this case, the positive correlations arise because of the incentive to protect against infectious diseases that neighboring municipalities have in common. However, we could deny this explanation for the following two reasons. First, our analysis covers a wide range of vaccines, including those against childhood diseases and those that protect the elderly. In addition, the spread of disease between airborne diseases, such as measles, and sexually transmittable diseases, such as HPV, differs. Hence, the positive correlation consistently found across vaccines could be unlikely because of common susceptibility. Second, we find a consistent result even in the analysis using the FITS-M matrix, where geographical dependence matters less (see Table S9 ). Few of the coefficients of the other demographic and socioeconomic variables are statistically significant. Exceptions include the coefficient of tax revenue for the PPSV23 equation, which shows a positive coefficient. The coefficient of the proportion of children and the elderly is found to be not statistically significant, either. Finally, the medical doctors' ratio among the public officers is not found to be correlated with the vaccination subsidy. Whereas Sakanishi, Fukumori, and Sugioka (2014) emphasize the role of medical doctors in local governments to make decisions on vaccine policies, our result suggests that this case cannot be generalized to municipalities nationally.
| Regression analysis: Robustness check
We conduct three analyses as a robustness check. The first check is to use an alternative measure of subsidies, that is, the subsidy amounts for the vaccinations (Table S10 ). The second check is a subsample analysis using the limited sample to only the greater Tokyo area where the assumption that free-riding effects exist irrespective of prefecture borders is most likely to hold (Table S11) . Table S12 shows the estimation results with the dependent variables associated with the scope or scale of the vaccination subsidy. All the results are qualitatively consistent with those shown in Table 3 , with an exception that the coefficient estimate of subsidy provisions in surrounding prefectures in the second analysis is no longer statistically significant possibly because of the smaller sample size.
| DISCUSSION
The number of municipalities in Japan that provide vaccination subsidies is low, and it is important to understand how decisions on such policies are made at the municipality level. This study examines the determinants of the vaccination subsidy policy of Japanese municipalities, using a spatial Durbin model.
The results of the presented regression analysis are threefold. First, vaccination subsidy policy is correlated with neighboring municipalities in the same prefecture, although such correlations are not observed with municipalities in surrounding prefectures, except for HPV vaccine, suggesting that Japanese municipalities follow neighboring municipalities to make decisions on vaccination policies. Together with the small number of municipalities that provide vaccination subsidies, we can interpret the low level of program implementation as a consequence of a "race to the bottom." The existence of policy diffusion does not always lower the level of vaccination subsidies, and a general argument of the welfare implications of policy diffusion is beyond the scope of our study. However, following neighboring municipalities on policy making indicates that the goal of policies is not necessarily optimizing outcomes, presumably the health of the community, in this case.
Second, few of the other socioeconomic or fiscal characteristics of municipalities are correlated with vaccination subsidy policy. In particular, two points are noteworthy. First, fiscal status is less likely to affect program implementation. This finding indicates that vaccination subsidies are determined regardless of the fiscal situation of municipalities. This is partly because the size of the funds that municipalities require to implement a vaccination subsidy program is not large when compared with the total budget. Second, municipalities are unlikely to consider the size of the population eligible for the program, indicating that the magnitude of beneficiaries is unlikely to be an important factor in policy making. One of the important benefits of local government autonomy regarding public service provision is tailoring services according to the demand of the residents of the local district (Faguet, 2004) . Our results suggest that the size of potential beneficiaries is not systematically taken into account while formulating vaccination subsidies in Japan.
Third, we also find free-riding behavior by municipalities in terms of vaccination policies. However, the magnitude of free-riding behavior is smaller than the effect of positive diffusion with neighboring municipalities in the same prefecture. The externality from vaccination via subsidies could theoretically affect the decision making of localities. In particular, the current situation of vaccination subsidies in Japan, given the small number of municipalities that actually provide subsidies, could be a result of free riding on neighboring municipalities. The greater magnitude of positive diffusion effects than free riding, however, suggests that a standard way of internalizing the externality is not sufficient to increase the provision of vaccination subsidies at the local level.
As for the source of policy diffusion, we could interpret it as yardstick competition. A growing literature has identified the factors behind these spatial correlations in policies (Costa-Font & Moscone, 2008; Costa-Font & Moscone, 2008; Fernandez & Forder, 2015) and emphasize the importance of yardstick competition (Atella et al., 2014; Elhorst & Freret, 2009) . Consistent with this fact, the literature on fiscal federalism points out that the decisions of local governments in Japan are often interdependent (Bessho & Terai, 2011; Tanaka, 2009) . Yardstick competitions occur due to asymmetric information between players and are often facilitated through information spillover among localities based on career motives to provide high level of welfare provision expected by their electorate, so-called yardstick competition from the bottom, or, to demonstrate the local leader's performance to the central government for future promotion, so-called yardstick competition from the top, the latter mostly happening in the Chinese context (Li & Zhou, 2005; Calderia, 2012) . In our case, yardstick competition based on election motivation may seem unlikely to be the most important factor for local leaders as the budget of vaccine subsidies are not large when compared with the total budget and other public expenditure. Still, vaccination policies are very recognizable policies and have direct impacts on health, causing great concern among political leaders. Hence, local governments could interact with each other in their policymaking to avoid a damage to reputation in cases of rare events of severe reactions from vaccination assuming that individuals may not necessarily have perfect knowledge of vaccine efficacy and the risk of side effects and hence may judge the performance of the local government relative to their neighboring localities, based on the subsidy policies that they provide.
The results of our analysis could have implications for the effectiveness of the decentralization of public service provision. In the case of services that produce positive spillover effects, such as vaccinations, the theoretical prediction of decentralization is shown to be suboptimal, as the effect of public service provision in one city affects the outcome in another (Besley & Coate, 2003) . Consistent with this finding, Khaleghian (2004) empirically finds that the effect of decentralization on the immunization rates of childhood vaccinations can be negative for some developing countries. Our results suggest a potential negative consequence of decentralization on immunization not through free-riding effects, as the theory suggests, but through an alternative path, namely, yardstick competition.
In the literature on health economics, a positive spatial correlation in health expenditure is repeatedly reported. However, the source of such a correlation is not well understood (Atella et al., 2014; Costa-Font & Moscone, 2008; Costa-Font & Pons-Novell, 2007; Fernandez & Forder, 2015) . In this regard, Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016) identify demand-side health care factors such as health needs due to geographical similarity. Our findings of a spatial correlation in health care policies through yardstick competition could be a source of positive correlations in health care expenditure through supply-side factors.
Owing to the externalities of vaccination, most countries have vaccination policies in one form or another, and it is important to understand how such policies are formulated. However, research on vaccination policy making is limited, and this study bridges that gap in the body of knowledge on how vaccination policies are created. Our results show that policy making on vaccinations at the local level is based on political incentives and that it does not necessarily aim to optimize community health, thus questioning the autonomy of local government authorities regarding forming vaccination policies.
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